Microsoft Entra role groups are used to differentiate ZTNA admins with users granted different tenant roles (one for admin and one for viewer).
Local administrator accounts maintained as a 'break-glass' fallback in case of Entra connectivity issues.
Primary security concern is the vulnerability of these local accounts: they are currently linked to standard email addresses. If an attacker identifies a local admin username and compromises the associated email, they could initiate a password reset and gain full ZTNA administrative rights.
What are the recommended ways to harden these 'break-glass' accounts using existing tools?
ZTNA.
Separation of duty for administration.
Use MFA functionality for locally created ZTNA administrators, but send the code to another administrators mobile device using the following steps:
When admin1 logs in, admin2 is challenged for the VIP token and admin1 will get on when accepted.