Attackers may send TCP packets with forged sequence or acknowledgment numbers.
Certain clients or embedded devices may have flawed TCP implementations.(Examples: sending ACKs for unsent data, retransmitting corrupted SEQ numbers, etc.)
The VS receives packets with incorrect sequence numbers from the client.
Example:
VS has ACK'd up to raw ACK number 2618035085.
But it receives a packet with sequence number 1701396855, which is not the expected next sequence.
Indicates significant packet loss or desynchronized TCP flow.
This deviation may trigger the FAKE_SESSION detection logic in the SE dataplane.
The VS receives ACKs from the client that acknowledge more data than was sent.
Example:
VS sends a packet with raw sequence number 1701410630.
Client responds with an ACK for 2618035314 — beyond what VS has actually transmitted.
This results in a FAKE_SESSION alert being raised.
This could mean:
A client-side anomaly or spoofing attempt
A proxy, or poorly behaving TCP stack manipulating sequence/ACKs
tcpstatsYou can validate this behavior by checking tcpstats counters on the VirtualService:
Login to Controller shell:
show virtualservice <name> tcpstatsA very high value confirms that the SE received many packets where the ACK was beyond what it actually sent, reinforcing the FAKE_SESSION diagnosis.
We recommend the customer to review their network infrastructure and client-side behavior to identify potential causes, such as TCP manipulation, packet drops, unexpected sequence numbers from the client or ACKs for data not yet transmitted by the SE.