If there IS NOT a rule listed under "WHAT TRIGGERED THIS ALERT?"
Open the Alert Triage for the relevant Alert. Note: In the interactive process tree window, any tiles with a red shield tag are processes the Sensor applied a Deny or Terminate action on.
Scroll to the bottom of the webpage and find the Observations section.
A Policy Terminate or Policy Deny tag will be assigned to any Observation where either blocking action took place.
Expand the Observation for the relevant block event to see the Observation Details.
For the process and child process (if applicable) involved, note the Effective Reputation and TTPs assigned to each. Example:
Process: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Process Effective Reputation: TRUSTED_WHITE_LIST
TTPs: RUN_UNKNOWN_APP
Child Process: D:\Dev\GitHub\CustomFile.exe
Child Process Effective Reputation: NOT_LISTED
TTPs: UNKNOWN_APP, PACKED_CALL
At this point it's important to note that the block is going to be caused by a Blocking and Isolation Rule. We can use the data collected from step 5 to determine which rule caused the block.
If the block event states "A Deny Policy Action was applied", then that indicates it is matching a "Deny Operation" Blocking and Isolation rule.
If the block event states "A Terminate Policy Action was applied" then that indicates it is matching a "Terminate Process" Blocking and Isolation rule.
In a second browser tab, navigate to Enforce > Policy > [Policy Name] > Prevention > Expand "Blocking and Isolation".
Compare the effective reputation of the process and child process (if applicable) to the below table. Blocking and Isolation rules can block files if they match one of the following reputations:
Check if the TTPs of the blocked process to see if it aligns with the below operation attempts:
TTP:
Operation Attempt:
NETWORK_ACCESS
ATTEMPTED_SERVER
ATTEMPTED_CLIENT
Communicates over the network
RAM_SCRAPING
READ_SECURITY_DATA
Scrapes memory of another process
SUSPICIOUS_BEHAVIOR
PACKED_CALL
Executes code from memory
KNOWN_RANSOMWARE
DATA_TO_ENCRYPTION
SET_SYSTEM_FILE
KERNEL_ACCESS
Performs ransomware-like behavior
INJECT_CODE
HAS_INJECTED_CODE
COMPROMISED_PROCESS
PROCESS_IMAGE_REPLACED
MODIFY_PROCESS
MODIFY_PROCESS_EXECUTION
HOLLOW_PROCESS
Injects code or modifies memory of another process
FILELESS
Executes a fileless script
Using the example data from step 5 we can see the following would be matched:
File path: **\cmd.exe > Invokes an untrusted process > Deny operation
This would match because the process is CMD.exe and the child process is UNKNOWN
If the issue persists, open a case with Support and provide:
The alert ID / Observation ID of the block event
Full page screenshot of the observation detail of the block event (step 4)
Sensor logs from a machine that most recently blocked the file(s) in question
Additional Information
Permission rules take precedence over all Blocking & Isolation rules
The rule "Invokes an untrusted process" triggers when the child process is NOT_LISTED, UNKNOWN, or ADAPTIVE_WHITE_LIST
The Allow rules in Permissions don't cover "Invokes an untrusted process" but Bypass rules do
If a block event shows the file SHA256 value but no filename then virustotal can be used in some cases to lookup the potential filename this can occur if the sensor reported only the hash of the file but didn't full report the path and filename